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Japan=s Monetary Policy Transition, 1955-2004 
 
Abstract:  This paper surveys the postwar evolution of Bank of Japan (BOJ) monetary 
policy.  Using both qualitative and quantitative data, we describe the changes in the 
money supply process in response to changing institutional constraints.  We focus on 
the transition from quantitative to qualitative control mechanisms, illuminating, in 
particular, the important role of the BOJ=s lending guidance (Awindow guidance@) in the 
early periods and financial liberalization in subsequent periods.  Monetary policy 
reaction functions are estimated and used to identify major changes in policy 
instruments, targets, and indicators. We analyze the historical behavior of the money 
multipliers and their components, highlighting reasons for their current depressed state. 
We conclude with comments on current challenges facing the monetary authorities.  
JEL:  E52, E51, E58, E42 
  
I.  Introduction 
   Monetary systems and policies receive little attention when economies are 
performing well.  Until recently, there was not much interest in Japanese monetary 
policy.  Through most of the postwar period, Japanese economic performance was 
strong.  Low inflation with high and relatively steady output growth won the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) plaudits from all quarters.  Keynesians praised the Bank for following 
Keynesian policies while Milton Friedman characterized BOJ policymakers as “closet 
monetarists.”  Not many economists outside of Japan were very interested in the actual 
workings of Japanese monetary policy.  Most economists simply assumed—and a few 
even set out to prove—that Japan’s monetary system was built on a strong institutional 
platform.  For most, it was enough to know that BOJ policy worked.  If we had bothered 
to look deeper, perhaps we would have wondered how it could have worked so well.  
  Since the bursting of the “economic bubble” in 1990, contemporary monetary 
policy has come under intense scrutiny.  The BOJ, more than any other institution, is 
held responsible for Japan’s current economic stagnation.  There is irony here, since it 
is only recently that the BOJ has acquired the independence and instruments to conduct 
a modern monetary policy.    
  1  Japan’s monetary policy has undergone a profound transition over the postwar 
period in response to structural changes in the institutional environment.  It is 
insufficiently appreciated that the period of Japan’s “miracle economy” (ca. 1955-71) 
was a period of tightly controlled financial markets.  During this “high growth period,” 
a limited menu of financial products was permitted to be sold at administratively 
determined interest rates and in highly segmented markets (Suzuki, 1980, 1987).  The 
“bubble economy” (ca. 1985-90) overlapped a period of extensive financial 
liberalization.  Current monetary difficulties follow in the wake of the “big bang” 
reforms that commenced in 1996.  As part of these reforms, the new Bank of Japan Law, 
that took effect in April 1998, gave the Bank considerable independence from the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and other organs of the government.  Although this 
provocative history is fascinating in its own right, the motivation for this paper is the 
belief that Japan’s current economic difficulties can best be understood in light of it.   
  From the point of view of monetary policy, Japan’s post-occupation economy 
can be usefully divided into three policy regimes.  The first period, which we refer to 
as the “quantitative control period,” runs roughly from 1955 up to the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in early 1971.  This was a period of 
comprehensive economic controls and bureaucratic guidance of markets.  The 
bureaucratic control regime was shook to its foundations in the turbulent years of the 
early 1970s.  The collapse of the fixed exchange rate system, Nixon’s surprise opening 
to China, and the two oil shocks (1973-74 and 1979-80) ushered in a new era of 
globalization pressures.  More shocks, both internal and external, followed.  The next 
twenty years witnessed a slow but deliberate liberalization of the Japanese economy 
and financial system.  The “financial liberalization period” (ca. 1971-90) brought about 
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the financial sector.  Economic growth remained strong and Japan was increasingly 
viewed as the leader in the emerging “Pacific Century.”  The great asset inflation of the 
“bubble economy” era (ca. 1985-90) was initially viewed as a natural consequence of 
Japan’s economic prowess.  Towards the end of the period, however, concerns that 
ordinary Japanese were being priced out of the housing market led to increasing 
pressure on the BOJ to take corrective action.  The “post-bubble stagnation period” (ca. 
1990-present) begins with the pricking of the asset bubble by the BOJ in the third 
quarter of 1991 and continues to the present.  One of the distinctive features of this 
period is the adoption by the BOJ of policy tools and practices broadly patterned after 
those of the U.S. Federal Reserve System. 
  For convenience, we use the traditional instruments-targets approach in 
describing Japan’s monetary policy transition.  Caution is required, however, in the 
interpretation of policies under this framework.  Until recently, Japanese policy 
instruments and implementation procedures deviated substantially from those under the 
Anglo-American model.  During most of the postwar period, key policy instruments 
and non-final targets were under the direct guidance of monetary policymakers.   
Final targets, however, were similar to those of other OECD countries.  The final 
targets of the BOJ have consistently been three: economic growth, price stability, and 
balance of payments stability.  Short-term emphasis has shifted between the three 
targets depending on current economic and political conditions.  Over the long-term, 
price stability has been the dominant policy concern.  Memories of the nearly disastrous 
hyperinflation of the early postwar period still hold sway over the BOJ. 
  In what follows, we provide a succinct summary of Japan’s monetary policy 
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points.  We ignore many details and nuances in order to focus on what we believe are 
the broad contours of policy.  We emphasize the institutional constraints underlying 
these policy choices.  Our descriptive analysis is based on BOJ policy statements, 
newspaper articles, and our reading of the relevant economic literature.  Our empirical 
work uses quarterly data.  The appendix provides definitions and sources for the data. 
II.  Quantitative Control Period (ca. 1955-1970) 
  The early postwar, post-occupation period was one of rapid economic growth.  
Over the period 1955-70, the real GNP growth rate averaged 9.7 percent.  An often 
overlooked aspect of this “miracle economy” is the highly controlled nature of the 
supporting financial system.  The domestic financial markets were segregated from the 
global markets by capital controls.  Banks and other financial firms operated in highly 
segmented domestic markets.  Virtually all interest rates were administratively 
controlled.  The development of securities markets was suppressed.  Banks provided 
over 90 percent of the funds for industrial and commercial expansion.  As a 
consequence, there was a near one-to-one correspondence between investment 
spending and loan growth.  Money growth was also highly correlated with loan growth. 
MOF, through money market dealers (tanshi gaisha), administered the call lending rate 
in the interbank market.  Interest rates in the short-term money markets were never 
permitted to fall below the BOJ’s discount rate.  The discount rate was a tool for 
adjusting the profit margin of banks.  With BOJ loans rationed, the discount rate was 
not an important policy instrument.  With interest rate spreads pre-determined, the 
incentive for banks was to maximize size rather than return on assets.  The MOF 
provided an implicit guarantee that no bank would be allowed to fail and no bank did.  
  4Companies were tied to banks through the main bank system. Borrowers were tied to 
lenders through “relational banking” rather than market-based contractural 
relationships.  Calder (1993) fittingly described the Japan of this period as a “bankers’ 
kingdom.”   
  Although BOJ policy makers faced a set of complex institutional constraints, 
the monetary policy that emerged was relatively simple (figure 1).  With overall 
economic policy focused on high-speed growth, the BOJ’s task was to support rapid 
investment while containing inflation.  Bank loans were the logical intermediate target. 
Since indirect control of lending and investment was not possible under the interest rate 
control regime enforced by the MOF, the BOJ relied on quantitative control measures. 
BOJ loans provided the main source of funds for bank loans.  With the discount rate 
fixed below the interbank and open market lending rates, the demand for BOJ loans 
was highly elastic.  BOJ credit was rationed to prevent “excessive competition” from 
generating explosive inflation.   
Bank loans were also directly controlled through a policy known as “window 
guidance.”  The window in question was not the discount window at the central bank.  
Rather, it was the lending window at major banks.  The BOJ provided periodic 
guidance to banks in the form of quarterly loan growth targets.  Although this policy is 
often described as “moral suasion,” it is more appropriately considered an application 
of administrative guidance (gyōsei shido).  Rhodes and Yoshino (1999) found a near 
perfect compliance with BOJ lending guidance.  Figure 2 shows that city bank loans 
during this period stayed within one percent of the BOJ growth target (with the 
exception of 1964:4).  Banks had good reasons to “voluntarily” comply with window 
guidance.  BOJ controlled access to the discount window and MOF approval was 
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increasing size and profitability.  Bigger size led to larger window guidance allocations. 
 Increased size conferred prestige and led to greater access to political markets. 
Window guidance was generally used in cooperation with other policy 
instruments.  Figure 3 indicates that window guidance and call rate changes tended to 
be mutually supporting (the discount rate moved in sync with the call rate).  During 
periods of monetary tightening, the call rate was raised and the BOJ lowered its WG 
target.  This complementary employment of window guidance is the reason it is often 
described as a “supplementary tool” of monetary policy (Suzuki, 1987; Yasuda, 1981). 
 In our view, it is more accurately described as a “primary tool” during this period.  
Window guidance was crucial in preventing excessive lending and money growth.   
  In retrospect, the success of monetary policy during this period owed a lot to 
favorable banking conditions.  High economic growth and captive borrowers made it 
easy to find good bank customers.  With most lending collateralized by land, steadily 
rising land prices made lending appear virtually risk free.  The quantitative control 
policy “worked” as long as banking markets were protected and high growth persisted. 
Such specialized conditions could not endure, but few people realized it at the time. 
  Table 1 shows the results of estimated reaction functions using quarterly data.  
Explanatory variables were lagged four quarters.  Lagged dependent variables were 
added to allow for partial adjustment of instruments to targets.  In column one, the 
logarithm of BOJ loans (Lboj) was used as the dependent variable.  The results support 
the view that the BOJ was targeting all bank loans (L).  As expected, the BOJ reduced 
lending when bank loans expanded beyond the target level (assumed to be constant).  It 
also reduced lending when its long-run targets, real GDP (Y) and the GDP deflator (Pg), 
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another long-run target, entered with a positive sign, but was insignificant by normal 
standards.  The log of broad money (M2 + CDs) was positive and highly significant. 
As long as bank loans and nominal GDP stayed within target ranges, the BOJ was 
willing to accommodate money expansion.   
  The dependent variable in column two is window guidance (WG) to city banks. 
Although WG was in effect over the entire period, our WG data begins in 1964:1.  
Regression results are for periods of active guidance only.  As expected, bank loan 
growth entered with a negative and significant sign.  The BOJ imposed lending 
restrictions whenever aggregate bank loans exceeded target levels.  Only one other 
potential target/indicator entered with a significant sign.  The regression results suggest 
that the BOJ increased the growth targets for bank loans when the rate of change of land 
prices was positive.  Clearly, the BOJ was not trying to control land prices during this 
period.  Since land provided collateral for bank loans, the BOJ may have been willing 
to extend more credit when the collateral values of banks’ loans were increasing. 
III.  Liberalization Period (ca. 1971-89) 
  The four main pillars of the financial control system were capital controls, 
interest rate controls, product restrictions, and market segmentation.  From the early 
1970s onward, these pillars were slowly and steadily eroded.  The breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods system began the process of financial liberalization as exchange rate 
movements became subject to the whims of the market and foreign politics.  This first 
“Nixon shock” provided U.S. policy makers a lever to pry open Japan’s financial 
markets.  Other global pressures included the growth of world trade, the computer and 
information technology revolution, the Euromarket phenomenon, and the collapse of 
  7the Communist system.  Japan’s ballooning current account surplus led to increasing 
international frictions and helped to drive the liberalization process.  The main 
domestic catalyst for liberalization was the large budget deficits of the 1970s. These 
deficits resulted when the 1970s growth slowdown failed to provide enough tax 
revenues to support Prime Minister Tanaka’s ambitious public spending program.  The 
deficits were greatly exacerbated by the two oil shocks. The large deficits were more 
than the controlled interest rate regime could bear.  The control regime, which relied 
upon the willingness of banks to absorb government debt at below market rates, could 
not be sustained once the level of debt pushed banks beyond their thresholds of pain.    
  To foreigner market participants, the gradual liberalization process was akin to 
Chinese water torture.  Japanese bureaucrats and politicians argued that the slow pace 
was necessary to avoid costly economic disruptions.  Confusing matters was the fact 
that liberalization measures were often said to be “in principle” or subject to 
“customary practices.”  Even when fully opened, it didn’t take market participants long 
to learn that the door was still firmly attached to its hinges.  In 1979, for example, 
legislation authorizing the liberalization of capital flows was passed by the Diet. The 
fight over implementation continued until 1984 with the signing of the Yen-Dollar 
Accord.  The liberalization of deposit rates can be traced to the introduction of large 
denomination CDs in May 1979. The last phase of deposit rate liberalization was said 
to have been completed in 1994, but the BOJ continues to issue “voluntary” guidelines 
as to the maximum allowable deposit rates.  Over this period many new financial 
products were introduced and market segmenting barriers were substantially lowered.  
The relaxation of bank branching and ATM restrictions reduced the MOF’s leverage in 
matters of informal guidance.  Increased competition in the financial sector gradually 
  8weakened the effectiveness of window guidance which was formally ended in 1990.  
Integrating backwards over all the liberalization measures, one cannot help but be 
impressed at the extent of financial control during the earlier high growth era.   
Japan’s real economic growth rate averaged a respectable 4.2 percent during 
this period.  The rapid growth obscured fundamental problems in the financial sector.  
Liberalization of capital markets brought intense competition to the banking sector.  As 
major corporations began to rely increasingly on capital markets for funding, banks had 
to look elsewhere for new customers and markets.  Banks continued to compete 
aggressively to maximize loan size.  Compensation of branch managers was based on 
their loan growth performance relative to competitors.  Banks created lending 
companies (Jusen) in an effort to avoid remaining interest rate controls and window 
guidance.  An increasing share of loans went to finance real estate, construction, and 
equity transactions.  Using the logic of the “real bills doctrine,” bank management felt 
they were making prudent investments.  Their loans were collateralized with assets that 
were rising rapidly in value.  By the end of the period, Japan dominated the ranks of the 
world’s largest banks.  Few economists foresaw the crisis in the making. 
Although a schematic diagram of monetary policy during the liberalization 
period (figure 4) suggests little change, policy implementation became increasingly 
complicated as liberalization progressed.  The strong linkage between bank lending and 
the economy that characterized the earlier period was substantially weakened.  With the 
liberalization of capital markets, central bank control over bank lending no longer 
guaranteed control of investment spending and the money supply.  As corporations 
increasingly diversified their sources of funds, banks began to aggressively compete for 
loans in unfamiliar markets.  The BOJ continued to target bank loans, but it began to 
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important auxiliary indicator.  With interest rate liberalization and a weakening of the 
bank loan channel, the call rate became an important instrument of monetary policy.  
Window guidance was actively used, but its effectiveness in controlling aggregate 
lending and money growth probably weakened toward the end of the period (Rhodes 
and Yoshino, 1999).  With the spread between the call rate and the discount rate 
remaining positive throughout the entire period, the BOJ continued to ration credit.   
Rising trade frictions over the period led to increasing pressure on Japan to 
reduce its huge current account surplus.  Since domestic politics prevented 
liberalization of key sectors such as agriculture, construction, and finance, there were 
calls for Japan to increase imports by expansion of aggregate demand.  With MOF 
ruling out fiscal policy due to the large budget deficits, monetary policy was the default 
option.  Monetary expansion, however, conflicted with the Reagan Administration’s 
goal of yen appreciation.  Following the Plaza Accord of September 1985, the yen 
began a rapid appreciation.  The Louvre Agreement in February 1987 sought to check 
the rise in the yen.  Expansionary money growth from 1986 to 1990 fueled a dramatic 
rise in asset prices.  The “bubble economy” was the result of a complex interaction of 
domestic politics, foreign pressure, and banking behavior.   
Table 2 reports the results of regressions for the liberalization period.  Reaction 
functions were estimated for the (inverse) call rate (Rc) and window guidance (WG).  In 
the case of the call rate regressions, we discovered some significant differences 
between the early and late liberalization periods.  Column one provides estimates for 
the early period.  The log of the monetary base (MB) entered the regression with a 
positive sign.  Other things the same, an increase in the monetary base was associated 
  10with a contemporaneous decline in the call rate.  As expected, the BOJ responded to 
inflation, by raising the call rate one quarter later.  Increases in equity prices (Ps) were 
also associated with subsequent increases in the call rate.  The positive but insignificant 
sign on the yen-dollar exchange rate (Yendol) does not offer evidence of exchange rate 
targeting.   
Column two gives regression results for the later phase of the liberalization 
period.  This was a time of trade frictions and the bubble economy.  In this period, the 
sign on the money base coefficient is reversed.  An increase in the monetary base is 
associated with a contemporaneous rise in the call rate.  This positive correlation may 
indicate that the BOJ was attempting to offset changes in the demand for base money. 
Inflation enters with a highly significant sign.  The rate of change of land prices is 
marginally significant.  The positive sign on the coefficient suggests that the BOJ did 
not attempt to thwart the emerging land price bubble.  There is evidence that the BOJ 
was concerned about the exchange rate (Yendol) in this period of trade frictions.  The 
BOJ responded to yen appreciation by lowering the call rate.   
Column three reports regression results using city bank window guidance (WG) 
as the dependent variable.  The results for WG are qualitatively the same as for the 
earlier period of quantitative controls.  The BOJ appears to have used WG to control the 
growth of bank loans (L).  The bank tightened WG whenever bank loan growth rose 
above desired levels.  The rate of change of land prices was also highly significant.  
Once again, the correlation between land appreciation and the BOJ’s lending growth 
target was positive.  Clearly, the BOJ was not attempting to offset the growth of land 
prices during the bubble period.  It tolerated, in fact, substantial increases in lending 
growth during this period. 
  11IV.  Post-Bubble Stagnation Period (1990-Present) 
   During the six years of the “bubble economy” (1985-90) real GDP grew at an 
average annual pace of 4.9 percent.  What came to define the period, however, was the 
rapid run-up of asset values (real estate, stocks, and collectables).  Land prices in 
Japan’s six major cities grew at a compound annual rate of 20.5 percent.  With the 
younger generation complaining bitterly about being priced out of the housing market, 
the BOJ came under tremendous pressure to do something about the “bubble.”  In May 
1989 the BOJ took action by raising the discount rate from 2.5 to 3.25 percent.  With 
the public and politicians clamoring for further action, the BOJ raised the rate four 
more times until it reached a plateau of 6 percent in August 1990.  The growth of money 
(M2+CDs) went from 11.7 percent in 1991 to 0.6 percent in 1992.  The bubble had been 
pricked:  prices of land and equities collapsed.  Although the BOJ reversed its policy 
course in July 1991, land prices have continued to decline up to the present time.  At the 
end of 2002, the urban land price index was back to its 1983 level.  Stock prices had 
fallen to a 20 year low.  The bubble has turned into a black hole.  
No one was surprised when the Japanese economy decelerated from 5.6 percent 
growth in 1990 to 2.4 percent in 1991.  Concern was expressed when the annual growth 
continued at less than one percent through 1994.  When the economy registered back to 
back growth rates of 3.1 and 3.3 percent in 1995 and 1996, it appeared that the corner 
had been turned.  In 1997, the year of the Asian financial crisis and several major 
Japanese bank failures, the economy fell back to near zero growth.  It has been 
stagnating ever since.  From 1991 through 2002, the average annual rate of GDP 
growth was only 1.2 percent.  With the government debt now exceeding 140 percent of 
GDP, there is little support for further fiscal expansion.  Professional and public 
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By traditional measures, monetary policy has been expansionary throughout the 
long stagnation.  In July 1991 the discount rate was lowered from 6 to 5.5 percent.  
Since that time, it has been lowered fifteen times until it achieved an unprecedented low 
of 0.10 percent in September 2001.  The call rate has fallen from 5.6 percent in 1991 to 
its current value of 0.002 percent.  Since February 1999 the BOJ has followed a zero 
interest rate policy (ZIRP).  With its preferred operating target reaching a floor, the 
BOJ has turned its attention to the monetary base.  The money base grew an average 7.8 
percent in nominal terms over the period 1996 through 2001.  The lowest annual rate 
of growth during that period was a healthy 7.3 percent in 1999.  Since March 2001, the 
BOJ has adopted a “quantitative easing policy.”  In 2002, the average of the monthly 
year-on-year growth rate was a record high of 27.6 percent.  The average for the first 
five months of 2003 has been 13 percent.   
While the growth of narrow money (M1) has responded to the rapid growth in 
the monetary base, broader measures of money (M2 + CDs, M3 + CDs, and Liquidity) 
have barely grown at all.  Over the period 1996-2002, M1 growth averaged 12 percent. 
Over this same period, however, the growth rate of M2+CDs averaged only 3 percent. 
A look inside the multipliers is revealing.  Since 1996, the multipliers for broad money 
(m2cd and m3cd) have been nearly cut in half (figure 5).  Figure 6 reveals two 
important reasons for this development.  Bank reserves held at the central bank have 
risen sharply relative to ordinary deposits (“deposit money”).  There has also been a 
dramatic portfolio shift from less liquid deposits (“quasi money” and CDs) to ordinary 
deposit money.  With interest rates on all assets near zero, there is little reason to hold 
less liquid deposits.   
  13In spite such unprecedented monetary stimulus, the real Japanese economy 
continued to languish and deflation appeared on the scene.  Over the period 1994-2002, 
the GDP deflator fell in 8 out of the last 9 years and declined at an average annual rate 
of 0.94 percent.  Since 1995, the CPI has fallen 5 of the last 8 years and declined at an 
average annual rate of 0.5 percent.  Is this modest deflation a sign of the 
Götterdämmerung?  Many proclaim it so.  Does it reflect a failure of BOJ policy?  That 
is not so easy to establish. 
By the midpoint of this period, Japan had acquired all of the tools necessary to 
conduct a modern monetary policy.  A schematic depiction of the BOJ’s instruments 
and targets (figure 7) looks very similar to that of the Federal Reserve.  The one 
exception, perhaps, is the long laundry list of intermediate indicators.  The list reflects, 
no doubt, the political pressures accumulating from the lengthy stagnation.  During this 
period, the BOJ dropped its last ties to the old quantitative control system.  Window 
guidance was discontinued after the third quarter of 1990.  On March 31, 1995 the 
discount rate rose above the call rate for the first time.  It has remained there for most 
of the subsequent period.  The call rate, until its dramatic decline, took center stage as 
a true operating instrument.  The BOJ influences the call rate through buying and 
selling operations in the interbank markets.  Open market operations (OMO) have 
emerged as the primary tool of monetary policy.  Figure 8 shows the “quantitative 
easing policy.”  With the call rate at zero, base money has now taken a position as the 
de facto operating target. 
  Table 3 provides estimates of a reaction function for the post-bubble period.   
The dependent variable is the (inverse) call rate.  Inflation is the only variable that 
enters the regression with a significant coefficient.  In the first decade of the period, the 
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lowered the call rate as deflation progressed.  The call rate lost all effectiveness as a 
policy instrument after 1999:1. 
  Table 4 reports regression results using money multipliers as dependent 
variables.  The regressions include a dummy variable for the first oil shock.  The 
estimated results are qualitatively the same for M1 and M2+CDs.  The multipliers are 
negatively correlated with the rate of change of the call rate and positively correlated 
with the rate of change of land prices and the log of GDP.  These results are expected. 
A fall in the call rate increases bank reserves and, ceteris paribus, lowers the base 
multiplier.  An expanding economy (increase in GDP) will encourage bank lending.  
Increased lending will also be encouraged by higher land prices since land serves as 
collateral for most loans.  The decline in all three variables during the past decade is 
behind the fall in the money multipliers. 
V.  Conclusion 
   The BOJ now possesses the tools it requires to conduct a modern, market-based 
monetary policy.  Why is it, then, that monetary policy is commonly asserted to be 
“broken”?  Many of the tools are new.  Could it be that they were designed for a more 
advanced financial structure?  For the market-based tools to be effective, markets and 
market mechanisms must be well functioning.  Japan’s banking system, which 
performed adequately under earlier guided-market regimes, has found the transition to 
a market-based system difficult to manage.  Compounding matters, the banking system 
is burdened with large amounts of non-performing loans.  Although bank lending rates 
are now free “in principle,” they cannot be said to be market rates.  Few transactions are 
occurring at posted lending rates.  In spite unprecedented easing by the BOJ, bank loans 
  15have fallen for 65 consecutive quarters.  Cowboys and Keynesians know that a horse 
led to water may not drink.  If it has not taken a drink after eleven years, should we 
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  18ABBREVIATIONS: 
 
BOJ:  Bank of Japan 
CAB:  Bank Reserves (Current Account Balances at BOJ) 
CASHARE:  Current Account Share of GNP 
CUR:  Currency in Circulation 
DD:  Demand Deposits 
DM:  Deposit Money 
D.W.  Durbin-Watson Statistic 
FEMO:  Foreign Exchange Market Operations 
FOREX:  Foreign Exchange 
GDP:  Gross Domestic Product 
GNP:  Gross National Product 
IMO:  Interbank Market Operations 
QM:  Quasi Money (Total deposits less demand deposits) 
L:  All Bank Loans 
Lboj:  BOJ Loans 
MB:  Monetary Base 
M1:  CUR + DM 
m1:  M1/MB 
M2:  M1 + QM 
M2CD:  M2 + CDs 
m2cd:  M2CD/MB 
OMO:  Open Market Operations 
PG:  Goods Price Index 
PL:  Urban Land Price 
PS:  Stock Price Index 
RR:  Required Reserve Ratio(s) 
RC:  Overnight Call Rate 
RDC:  Official Discount Rate (ODR) 
WG:  Window Guidance to City Banks 






The primary source of data was NEEDS-ECONOMY, a computer database compiled 
by the Nihon Keizai Shimbun.  Recent monetary data were obtained from the Financial 
and Economics Statistics Monthly published by the BOJ.  Urban land prices were 
obtained from the Japan Statistical Yearbook.  The WG data used in this study are 
official BOJ statistics released at periodic new conferences and reported in various 
issues of the Nihon Keizai Shinbun.  Most of the data used in this study are described in 
detail in the appendix to Rhodes and Yoshino (1997). 
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  22TABLE 1 
Reaction Functions (Quantitative Control Period) 
 
  Dependent Variable  








(∆L/L)t-4   -413.570 
(-2.037)* 





Log(Y)t-4  -0.982 
(-3.834)*** 
 
Log(Pg)t-4      









    
Adjusted R
2 0.977  0.381 
h    
F 575.577  3.050 
Sample Period (Adjusted)  1956:1—1970:4  1964:1—1968:3 
       Notes:  t-values are in parentheses.  Level of significance: ***(1%), **(5%) and *(10%). 






  23FIGURE 4 
Monetary Instruments & Targets























  24TABLE 2 
Reaction Functions (Liberalization Period) 
 
  Dependent Variable 



























∆PL/PL   0.009 
(1.590) 
 
(∆PL/PL)t-4     56.237 
(2.174)** 










WGt-1     0.675 
(8.396)*** 
      
Adjusted R
2 0.919  0.940  0.633 
h or d       
F 80.768  122.426  44.085 
Sample Period (Adjusted)  1971:1—1979:4  1980:1—1989:4  1971:1—1989:4 
Notes:  t-values are in parentheses.  Level of significance: ***(1%), **(5%) and *(10%). 
Sources:  NEEDS-Economy and BOJ 
 










































  27 FIGURE 7 
Monetary Instruments & Targets
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Monetary Instruments & Targets




























  29TABLE 3 
Reaction Function (Post-Bubble Period) 
 
  Dependent Variable 
Explanatory Variables  1/Rc 
Constant 607.350 
(0.351) 


















Sample Period  1990:1—2002:4 
          Notes:  t-values are in parentheses.  Level of significance: ***(1%), **(5%) and *(10%). 
          Sources:  NEEDS-Economy and BOJ 
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TABLE 4 
Money Multiplier Regressions 
 
  Dependent Variable  
Explanatory Variables 
 
(1)   
m1* 






















    
Adjusted R
2 0.425  0.449 
d 0.407  0.338 
F 23.189  25.426 
Sample Period  1971:1—2001:1  1971:1—2001:1 
Notes:  t-values are in parentheses.  Level of significance: ***(1%), **(5%) and *(10%). 
Sources:  NEEDS-Economy and BOJ 